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CEPS, with financial assistance of the Finnish SITRA Foundation, embarked at the end of
2000 on a programme to examine the impact of Justice and Home Affairs  acquis on an
enlarged European Union, the implications for the candidate countries and for the states with
which they share borders. The aim of this programme is to help establish a better balance
between civil liberties and security in an enlarged Europe.
This project will lead to a series of policy recommendations that will promote cooperation in
EU JHA in the context of an enlarged Europe as well as institutional developments for the
medium- to long-term in areas such as a European Public Prosecutors Office, re-shaping
Europol and a developed system of policing the external frontier (Euro Border Guard). These
must be made within a balanced framework. There are two key issues:
  First of all, to prevent the distortion of the agenda by “events” – some items are being
accelerated and other marginalised. This risks upsetting the balance, carefully crafted by the
Finnish Presidency, between freedom, security and justice. The current ‘threat’ is that security
issues, at the expense of the others, will predominate after the catastrophic events of 11th
September. These have resulted in a formidable political shock, which served as a catalyst to
promote certain initiatives on the political agenda, such as the European arrest warrant, and a
common definition of terrorism. The monitoring of items, which could be marginalised and
the nature of the institutional/political blockages that could distort the Tampere agenda, is our
priority.
  Secondly, how to look beyond the  Tampere agenda, both in terms of providing a flexible
approach during the period of completion of the Tampere programme as well as what should
come afterwards. Much detail remains to be filled in about rigid items on the Tampere agenda
and CEPS will continue to work in three very important areas:
•  Arrangements for managing and policing the external frontier
•  Judicial co-operation leading to the development of a European Public Prosecutor
•  Strengthening of  Europol, particularly in the field of serious trans-frontier violence and
moves towards a more federalised policing capacity
The CEPS-SITRA  programme brings together a multi-disciplinary network of 20 experts
drawn from EU member states, applicant countries as well as  neighbouring states: the
European University Institute in Florence, the Stefan Batory Foundation (Warsaw), European
Academy of Law (ERA  Trier), Academy of Sciences (Moscow), London School of
Economics, International Office of Migration (Helsinki), Fondation  Nationale des Sciences
Politiques (CERI) in France, Universities of Budapest, Université Catholique de Louvain-la-
Neuve, University of Lisbon ( Autonoma), University of  Nijmegen, University of Burgos,
CEIFO in Stockholm, University of  Tilberg and University of Vilnius, as well as members
with practical judicial and legislative backgrounds.1
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Introduction
Does Russia need international cooperation? This question may seem rhetorical, to which one
would give a positive response, but the findings of a public opinion survey conducted by the
independent Russian research organisation ROMIR clearly suggest otherwise. In April 2001,
a total of 1,500 Russians were polled in 160 locations in 94 villages, towns and cities, in 40
regions, territories and republics of the Russian Federation. The questions asked concerned
several key aspects of EU-Russian relations and the need for increased  cooperation with
international organisations.
The survey found that 16% were definitely in favour of joint international efforts to combat
crime, 32% thought this might be a good idea and 44% had their doubts. Speaking about the
EU in general: only 2% said they fully trusted the EU, 15% said they more or less trusted it;
23% expressed their doubts; 27% said they did not trust the EU at all, and 33% were
indecisive. What are the reasons for this mistrust, and what meaning can be attached to the
response “this might be a good idea”?
First, there is an obvious lack of confidence among Russians in any international organisation.
NATO’s image is at rock bottom among the Russian people and their trust in the UN is at a
level comparable to that they place in the EU.
Second, the average Russian is still not very well informed about the EU as a political entity;
Russians have more understanding of bilateral relations with European countries. However, it
is quite possible that a survey undertaken in the border regions in northern and western of
Russia would reveal a higher level of trust in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)
cooperation.
Third, one can observe a steady trend in Russian public opinion that Russia is being cut off
from the rest of Europe by the Schengen borders.
Trust between unequal partners?
The problem can be better understood if one were to place it in a broader continental or
regional context. “While the EU shapes the regional system, states at its perimeter also affect
the development of the EU as a compound polity” (Leslie, 1999: 1). This represents my point
of departure to discuss EU-Russian imperatives for the JHA cooperation. The construction of
a “European area of freedom, security and justice” presupposes various levels of “inclusions”
and “exclusions” for the member states as well as outsiders/non-member states. The
construction consists of a “core” with clearly defined borders and a “periphery” with fuzzy
edges. Non-EU countries may remain excluded from decision-making (Iceland and Norway),
                                                
* Head of Regional Studies, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences.OLGA POTEMKINA
2
this exclusion serves as a threat and as an instrument for the candidate countries to adopt in
full the JHA  acquis  communautaire  (Monar, 2000: 11-12).  Russia as well as the other
neighbouring states are supposed to be excluded from the EU area of freedom, security and
justice.
The trust between the EU and Russia is one of unequal partners having asymmetric relations.
What kind of trust can exist between the European Union and a state that is excluded from the
emerging EU security zone together with the other countries that will have common borders
with the EU?
Another point is that, regardless of this unequal and asymmetric partnership, the EU and
Russia have to trust each other: a “good neighbourhood” surrounding the “area of freedom” is
the aim declared by the Tampere Council as well as “an open and secure Union”. (Tampere
Conclusions, §6). The aim is therefore very coherent. In order to be able to manage the
internationalised soft security risks, it seems quite evident that the EU will wish to cooperate
with the neighbouring states of Russia, Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova. It is also evident that
the member states have to build a common European internal security policy as they are not
able to overcome security threats in an isolated manner. On the one hand, the EU Eastern
neighbours are exporting security problems; on the other hand, during the period of
enlargement, they will be transformed into a buffer zone, a  cordon sanitaire, keeping the
potential migrants from Asian and African countries from penetrating into the Union. Thus,
the question of burden-sharing could emerge as a result of this process.
In sum the EU and Russia have no way out but to build mutual trust, as these are issues that
could only be decided jointly. What can both sides really do?
On Russia’s part, it could achieve the strategic purpose of becoming an equal partner of the
EU without the intention of accession. In this case the character of trust could change. Equal
partnership presupposes solving internal Russian problems (which at present give rise to
security risks), undertaking economic reform and building a civil society. Until then Russia
has to realise that it will live in a Europe with new dividing lines, and the task is how to
manage them.
On the part of the European Union, one could envisage a gradual shift from its “protective
strategy” (protective in the sense that it protects the “European area of freedom” from the
threats coming from the neighbouring countries) towards elaborating a pan-European security
strategy (including both external and internal dimensions) (Friis, 1999:163); “to find the right
balance between security and openness, between restrictive (“exclusive”) action and the
“inclusive” values of a political system which remains open towards neighbours and third-
country nationals”(Monar,2000:27).
An Institutional Framework for Cooperation
How to achieve the aim? Which instruments of cooperation should be used? There are several
documents of strategic significance, which form an institutional framework for cooperation.
First, there is the Partnership and Cooperation agreement (PCA) between the EU and the
Russian Federation (RF) signed in 1994. It can be considered as the first important step in the
proper direction, making reference to cooperation between the Parties to prevent criminal
activities, including money laundering and drug trafficking. The Amsterdam Council in June
1997 took the next step. The European Union action plan called for tackling organised crime
and emphasised the importance of closer cooperation and developing relations with Russia in
the fields of mutual concern. The European Council meeting in Cologne in 1999 contributed
much to accelerating the process by endorsing the EU Common Strategy on Russia. It was atRUSSIA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS
3
the Cologne summit when the need to establish a plan focused on common action with Russia
in the fight against organised crime was recognised, including actions to combat corruption,
money laundering, trafficking in drugs, human beings and illegal immigration.
Another brick in the wall supporting the EU-Russia JHA  cooperation was laid by the RF
adopting its medium-term strategy for the development of relations between the RF and the
EU (2000 to 2010). Cooperation in the field of law enforcement and establishing operative
contacts with EU bodies in fighting  transnational organised crime is considered one of the
strategic key elements. The European Union’s plan on Common action for the Russian
Federation on combating organised crime approved by the Helsinki Council in December
1999 (Official Journal C 106, 13/04/2000) and by the EU-Russia Cooperation Council on 10
April in Luxembourg was grounded on the solid base of strategic documents. Another
important factor should be added – the Helsinki plan is composed by taking into account two
important initiatives both of the EU and Russia: the European Union’s drug strategy (2000-
2004) and the special Federal programme to intensify the fight against crime (1999-2000)
approved by the Government of the Russian Federation in March 1999. Combining these
different initiatives with sometimes-asymmetrical approaches to the cooperation seems to be
an important move towards establishing a relationship of trust.
General principles and main areas of cooperation are outlined in the Action plan. Improving
international judicial  cooperation is considered as a top priority task. To ensure that a
legislative framework suitable for such cooperation exists, several efforts are demanded: to
adopt appropriate legislative measures and ratification and full implementation of the
international agreements on combating organised crime. In this sense European Conventions
are a powerful instrument for the JHA  cooperation, namely those against money laundering
and drugs trafficking.
Another area of mutual interest is law enforcement cooperation. An exchange of technical,
operational and strategic information between the appropriate law enforcement agencies is
planned as well as regular meetings of experts and training courses for the law enforcement
personnel. Working contacts between Europol and the respective Federation agencies are to
be developed in the framework of the Europol Convention.
There are many similar features of the discussed Action plan and the Pre-Accession Pact on
Organised Crime (Official Journal C 220, 15/07/1998) concluded by the EU JHA ministers
Council with the ministers of the candidate countries in May 1998. However, the eventual
goals of the documents are different according to the general context of relations of the EU-
Russia and the EU-candidate countries. Subsequently, the instruments to implement the
planned activities are not the same for the candidate countries and Russia. Technical
assistance programmes are mentioned in the Action plan. Meanwhile, shifting to a more pan-
European approach could mean engaging Russia more deeply into various training, exchange
and study programmes which already exist in the EU member states and which also apply to
the candidate countries as well, namely GROTIUS, OISIN, ODISSEUS, FALCONE,
OCTOPUS II. A new project of the European Commission, the Association of European
Police Colleges and ten member states “Curriculum” launched in October 1999 to assist the
applicant states in fighting drug trafficking, money laundering, car theft, illegal immigration,
trafficking in weapons and radioactive materials could be very helpful for using the existing
experience in Russia.
In analysing the strategic documents of the EU-Russia JHA cooperation, a question of format
and tools of cooperation arises. The Action plan itself can be regarded as one of the powerful
instruments of such kind. The format and framework of  cooperation are included in theOLGA POTEMKINA
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document. The implementation of the plan is supposed to be done through the PCA
subcommittee, which could coordinate the combat against organised crime in the framework
of the PCA. Regular meetings of Russian experts with those of the Europol suggested by the
plan have already been envisaged.
“High” and “Low” Politics
The problems of flee of capital and money laundering are obviously of main concern to the
law enforcement agencies in Russia as well in the member states. Various methods of
currency transfer are used by criminals– from cross-border transport of banknotes by persons,
smuggling of raw materials, energy and precious metals to complicated schemes of illegal
export and import trading and financial operations. Offshore zones have been used very
intensively to transfer and legalise criminal capital. According to Russian Federal Tax Police
Service officials, there are hardly any examples of civilised offshore Russian firms.
On the other hand, criminal foreign firms are “worthy” partners for Russian illegal groupings.
0ne even has to say – unfortunately – they are and that this is due to the fact that police
cooperation between Russia and the EU lags behind criminal cooperation. About $70 billion
belonging to criminal foreign groups is expected to be legalised in Russia in the coming years
(Nezavisimaja Gazeta, 2001). This illustrates the importance of a cooperation with the EU
and the member states to prevent breaking the tax laws.
To evade taxation foreign criminal structures use bank accounts in Russia and create “black”
enterprises. At present, several cases of joint Russian-foreign firms are investigated for being
sponsored by tax-hidden money in the criminals’ countries of origin. Last year the activity of
an illegal leasing firm was stopped. Since 1996 this company transferred $30 million annually
from Russia abroad. To counteract activities of this kind, Russian and EU member states’ law
enforcement and tax agencies plan to increase operational and investigating measures to
prevent tax criminality on the international level. They are to be based on more than 20
bilateral agreements. Other agreements are being prepared with law enforcement agencies in
Italy, Greece, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Rumania. In 1999 joint consultations with the
Federal Tax Police Service and Europol started, as well as with OLAF in order to prevent
frauds and counterfeit on the international scale.
Apart from the measures of “protocol character”, good working contacts have been
established with the German criminal police and law enforcement agencies of Finland,
Denmark, Sweden, the Netherlands, Slovakia, Poland and some other states.
Bilateral contacts are worth special attention, especially with regard to the countries that are to
form the neighbouring area after the enlargement takes place.
The recent agreements in the framework of the Pact of Stability for Southern Europe are very
important. The aim is to secure the future European Union borders and it seems to be of
mutual concern to all the states that have to fight illegal migration. By preparing and signing
re-admission agreements between the neighbouring states the main routes of illegal migration
and human trafficking from Asia through Russia, Ukraine, Moldova to Romania, Bulgaria
and Greece can be cut off. Yet another problem arises: if the “transit states” sign re-admission
agreements, are they able to deport all the illegal immigrants delayed at the EU and send them
back? The answer is obviously negative.
The October 2001 EU-Russia summit provided for another round of JHA  cooperation by
adopting statements on international terrorism. Police  cooperation was declared the key
matter in this field. Russia and the European Union decided “to consider the conditions and
detailed procedures for an exchange of information on:RUSSIA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS
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§  the activities and movements of individuals or groups belonging to terrorist networks or
maintaining links with such networks;
§  tickets of dubious authenticity;
§  supplies of arms, explosive, or dual-use goods;
§  new forms of terrorist activities, including chemical, biological or nuclear threats”.
However, one could notice that the process of the EU-Russia JHA  cooperation has been
developing in a very slow way without taking into account the urgency for not necessarily a
dialogue, but for specific actions. Measures “to combat money laundering and drug
trafficking, mutual administrative assistance in custom matters and in all other relevant areas”
(Statement on international terrorism) are more discussed than realised. A lot still needs to be
done to strengthen the ties between the Russian Ministry of Home Affairs and Europol, “the
Russian bureau” of Europol is still an idea, but not yet reality.
It is relevant to remind ourselves that there are several levels of trust and cooperation – that is
of “high” and “low” politics. As  Fairlie states, “the high politics of treaties, traditional
diplomacy and agreements between the EU and states are only part of the picture.
…Cooperation and positive results achieved at low levels may compensate for the political
risks which “high politics” still entail.” (Fairlie, 2000:15) In this context the “Baltic-Sea Task
Force on Organised Crime” has, since its foundation in 1996, played a significant role. It
consists of personal representatives of the Heads of State and Government in the Baltic Sea
region, including Russia, as well as of the European Commission and a representative of the
Presidency of the EU. The activities of the Task Force cover several areas: improved and
increased exchange of information, joint concrete and operative actions, judicial cooperation,
special survey and training. A number of  ad hoc groups fulfil their mission consisting of
experts from the police, customs and border authorities (Arnswald, 2000:148-149). To give an
example, the Task Force elaborated its own concept on Kaliningrad visa regime before the
Commission Communication was published. The proposals included empowering a consulate
of one of the member states to issue visas on behalf of the other member states. The Council
also suggested moving consulates close to borders, extending opening hours, increasing the
use of long term multiple entry visas, opening more border crossings and finally to introduce
shorter procedures at the border. Many proposals are similar to those of the Commission
Communication. However, there was one innovative suggestion to reduce the need for strict
visa procedures by introducing the establishment of extensive data banks combined with the
checking of fingerprints at borders. These measures could provide for a reduction of visas to a
mere stamp in the passport of those crossing borders. (Lithuanian Foreign Policy Review,
2000/2/6: 144-145)
The Kaliningrad “Puzzle” and the Asymmetry of the EU-Russian Relations
The Kaliningrad “puzzle” is an excellent case study to illustrate the asymmetry of the EU-
Russia relations, which entails a specificity of their mutual trust. It is absolutely obvious that
both sides are interested to solve the dilemma. But the question seems more sensitive for the
EU, who initiated the discussion, than to Russia. The reason is that Kaliningrad oblast (KO) is
regarded by the EU as a “black hole” in the “European area of freedom, security and justice”.
So the main objective of the EU policy is rather pragmatic: to guard the Single Market border
and to minimise soft security risks. The “Commission Communication on  Kaliningrad”
represents this viewpoint clearly. The majority of suggestions including visa and transit
regimes could be seen as an integral part of the EU “protective strategy”. The RussianOLGA POTEMKINA
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position on the other hand differs significantly, although formally the RF government inclines
to accept almost all suggestions. Russia is naturally interested to gain from the positive effects
of the enlargement process to the oblast after it becomes a Russian enclave in the Union. For
this reason the main accent is put on the transit regime and economic development of
Kaliningrad, including the Special Economic Zone – an issue which is approached by the EU
rather cautiously. The asymmetry and mistrust can be noticed in the partners’ position
towards the future status of Kaliningrad. The EU seems even more frightened than Russia
itself by the possibility of the oblast obtaining autonomy.  Fears of receiving a criminal
enclave in degradation, run by an absolutely corrupt regional authority appear to have
influenced the EU position towards Kaliningrad. An idea, which at the first sight looks rather
obscure; this is, to regard KO as a pilot project in the relationship with the European Union or
to think about some special regime for the oblast. This idea was mentioned a few times in
various Russian documents, but never in those of the EU. Kaliningrad oblast is an integral
part of Russia and should be treated according to this presupposition – that is the main point
being emphasised in the EU’s official approach (Commission Communication).
According to this approach the problem of the visa and transit regime is hereby solved. As an
integral part of Russia, Kaliningrad would be included in the “negative list” of the countries
whose nationals are not allowed visa-free movement to the EU. The only flexibility that is
supposed to be applied to Kaliningrad is to facilitate the visa obtaining procedure.  It needs to
be stressed that these suggestions are worked out (very) deliberately and seem rational only
for an ideal model. It is questionable whether this model would work in the  Kaliningrad
reality. The perception of mistrust could be noticed in the Russian position during the current
negotiations on this problem. The reaction of the RF government expressed in the “Evaluation
document” sent to the Commission on 19 March seems justified: “For that (Community
policies on visas and on external borders) we rather need the principal political decision,
while technicalities may be settled later on”(Uniting Europe, ¹138 –2/4/2001, P/6). From its
side, the Russian government suggests a one-year-term free Schengen visa for Kaliningrad
resident Russian citizens for visits to Lithuania, Poland and Latvia, rather than only
facilitating the procedure. Besides, Russia is preoccupied with the travel regime for nationals
of the “bigger” Russia, as no special arrangements were proposed in the Commission
Communication. The chances of coming to an agreement on this specific position seem rather
slim; the same can be applied to the case of the re-admission agreement with the oblast. As
such, an agreement can hardly be concluded for one region of Russia only. Lastly, the
Kaliningrad dilemma as a special problem both for Russia and the EU has emerged when
discussing the format of consultation. The Russian proposal “to single out the issue to be
discussed in the framework of a specific and single forum” instead of splitting the various
aspects of it among the different existing PCA sub-committees looks more reasonable than
that of the EU. Of course, by singling out Kaliningrad again as a quite unique Russian region
according to its geographic position, could add to the idea of looking for a special innovative
approach to the dilemma both from Russian and the EU parts.
The solving of the “puzzle” is complicated by the fact that no analogies are suggested by
world practice. Popular and sometimes extravagant parallels between Kaliningrad and Hong
Kong, Gibraltar, Cuba, Angola, Seuta and Melilia and many others do not convince in this
case. When creating these artificial analogies, only the geographic situation is taken into
account, whereas the economic, political, institutional aspects are ignored. In this very case
comparisons might be hardly relevant, as the oblast becomes an enclave not inside a country,
but inside a political entity, a union of several states with its specific rules and laws.RUSSIA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS
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By singling out KO as the only region of the Russian Federation in the enlargement
negotiations, the EU hereby confirms the oblast specific position and the necessity to find a
unique method of solving the problem. The question of KO status remains thus open.
The definition of Kaliningrad as a pilot project, which appeared in the strategy for developing
relations of the RF and the EU for 2000-2010 has changed into “a testing ground for working
out new effective forms of cooperation with the European Union”. But the sense remains the
same. The idea of a pilot project remains rather vague. One could believe that the testing of
the market economy mechanisms, which are new for Russia but familiar to the EU, could be
tried on the territory of this small enclave as a first step for an institutional compatibility of
the RF and the European Union. However, it must be absolutely clear that the unique
geographical situation and the rather peculiar character of the KO development may turn this
idea into a utopia.
A pilot project could mean perhaps not the specific example of the KO development that
could be followed by the other Russian regions. It could rather mean a special type of an EU-
Russia collaboration to solve the problem of this small enclave-enclave, with the possibility
that although Russia might be involved in the process of the European economic and social
area, it remains outside Europe. In this sense the oblast, being an integral part of the RF,
would become a real testing ground for the elaboration of a new relationship of Russia and the
EU.
In the event that Russia and the EU recognise the need to search for new approaches to solve
“the puzzle” by introducing a special regime for Kaliningrad, it would be relevant to talk
about several scenarios for the KO integration in the European economic area Joenniemi, et.
al., 2000:169-170).
The question of distribution of competence between the EU and Russian regional and federal
authorities seems very important. Realising a few contacts between Brussels and Kaliningrad,
the  oblast could establish broad links with Lithuania and the neighbouring Poland’s
voevodstva.  Cooperation with the regions that do not directly belong to the KO
neighbourhood – Swedish regions and German lands – could become an important component
of Kaliningrad’s external activities. (Stefan Batory Foundation, 2001: 6-7)
It is in this framework of a special approach that the question of “the pilot visa regime” could
emerge. The visa regime for the inhabitants of  Seuta and  Melilia might be taken as an
example. The analogies between the positions of these regions in general are artificial, but the
experience for the elaboration of a special visa regime is surely worth mentioning.
The new approach to the problem should be based on a perception that the partners – the EU
and Russia – regardless of any asymmetry or inequality of their relationship, are eager to
solve the “puzzle”. For Russia, Kaliningrad is really a native land that should be treated
properly. For the European Union, it is a region that is more involved in the integration
process than the whole of Russia itself and thus its future is very important to the EU.
Besides, Kaliningrad is the ground where both partners could work out some concrete policy
for both economic development of oblast and for minimising soft security risks. To achieve a
result and to find mutual trust they should realise that their asymmetric goals could be
combined in one – soft security risks cannot be overcome without taking decisions on
Kaliningrad’s economic and social future, economic and social developments can not be
achieved without hard efforts to establish the rule of lawOLGA POTEMKINA
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Conclusion and Proposals
The Kaliningrad case study could be regarded as a particular, though unique example, of the
EU-Russia JHA cooperation and mutual trust. There is an important phrase in the Action
plan: “Particular attention should be paid to the fact that prevention can play a significant role
in combating organised crime by reducing circumstances in which the phenomenon can
operate” (Action plan, 2). To establish the rule of law in Russia is indissoluble connected with
the economy revival process. Thus, the EU-Russia JHA cooperation is an integral part of the
activities on the way to a strategic partnership. This could be an answer to several ideas that
deeply associate Russia with the EU in the JHA matters. There will be no effect on enforcing
efforts in fighting organised crime apart from reforming an environment that allows crime to
flourish. Consequently, the specific form of trust in JHA matters is a part of a trust in a
general context that could or could not arise between the partners in the process of their
cooperation.
1.  The EU and Russia should intensify their dialogue on JHA cooperation. Up till now, it
has been placed below all the other matters of cooperation. The decisive step should be
taken by adding concrete activities to the Action plans.
2.  The existing experience of non-Schengen European states (Switzerland, Great Britain)
should be taken into account. Russia could be excluded from the Schengen zone while
being deeply associated with those items of the  Schengen  acquis related to police
cooperation as well as to information exchange through  Europol and  Schengen
Information System.
3.  The mechanism of cooperation needs to be cleared up. How should Russia develop the
consultations –through Europol or through the Schengen executive committee?
4.  A Russian office of Europol should be created.
5.  To engage Russia in JHA  cooperation, programmes such GROTIUS, OISIN,
ODISSEUS, FALCONE and OCTOPUS II, could be extended to Russia. These
programmes could create a common custom and other kinds of border control as well as
to prepare qualified personnel.
6.  As stated at the EU-Russian Summit in October 2001, “it is essential to guarantee
border security, while preventing borders from becoming an insurmountable barrier to
our citizens”. This means that talks should be continued on facilitating visa procedures
for the border residents not only in the Kaliningrad oblast, but also for those living in
Leningrad, Pskov and Murmansk oblast as well as in Ivan-gorod. The possibilities of
small border traffic should be examined more precisely. People living in the border
regions should be placed in a more privileged position than other Russian nationals.
Otherwise, cross-border cooperation will suffer severely.
7.  The EU Commission should intensify its information activity in Russia on the JHA
issues. Up to now there are few people in Russia who are aware of the problems and
opportunities for cooperation in this field.RUSSIA’S ENGAGEMENT WITH JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS
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